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SUBJECT: UNGA64: EU AND EFTA MEMBER STATES WELCOME AND

SUPPORT NEW U.S. PRIORITIES: REPORT PREPARED BY AREA ADVISOR FOR WESTERN EUROPE ROBERT SMOLIK

Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (d)

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

11. (U) The EU-27 responded to new U.S. flexibility at UNGA64 by collaborating pragmatically on our top priorities, and by providing essential
12. (SBU) Despite differences with us over the Freedom of Expression resolution, EU states contributed to a more positive outcome on the Defame
13. (C) While enthusiastic about new U.S. flexibility on disarmament and non-proliferation, Germany complicated eventual consensus on the Arms
14. (C) EFTA country delegations played influential niche roles: Switzerland's PR ably chaired the budget committee; Liechtenstein's PR led the
15. (SBU) Looking ahead to UNGA65, the WEOG quietly chose its candidate for President of that General Assembly, to be formally elected by the C
16. (C) Also looking forward to UNGA65, EU delegations at the UN (and in other international organizations) are moving deliberately towards an
To encourage the EU-27 to continue as our core supporters at UNGA65, we should engage them in early and energetic consultations on our UNGA65 a
END SUMMARY

STRONG SWEDISH EU PRESIDENCY

17. (U) Led by an organized and pragmatic Sweden-EU Presidency delegation, the 27 EU member states worked collaboratively and productively with
18. (C) The EU lobbied energetically for the three key country-specific human rights resolutions (Burma, DPRK, Iran, of which they ran the first

19. (C) The EU failed to achieve their desired consensus to

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vote together in favor of or to abstain on the Goldstone Report resolution, primarily because The Netherlands demanded a clear position of prin
10. (C) The EU's traditional negotiation with the Palestinian observer delegation over its Israel resolutions improved slightly in dynamic, bu
SPECIFIC COMMITTEE NEGOTIATIONS

11. (C) On Fourth Committee issues dealing with decolonization, France and the U.K. were strong partners. However, their influence within the
12. (U) On other Third Committee resolutions, particularly Right to Food, Rights of the Child, Right to Development, EU member states warmly w
13. (C) On Second Committee issues the EU was as frustrated as we were regarding the disconnect between positions taken by large G-77 nations

14. (C) On First Committee, the Arms Transfer Treaty (ATT) resolution ran into determined opposition from Germany (and Mexico). Germany's argu
15. (C) During UNGA64, the EU worked closely with us on the trade resolution. Negotiators, led by a Norwegian trade expert, nearly agreed on c
16. (U) Extra-EU support for our initiatives on preventing violence against women in armed conflicts came from Norway. The PR brought his nati

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practical programs to address the issue. Belgium's PR also hosted a side-event on this issue and is looking for U.S. engagement. The Vatican ot
17. (SBU) On the downside, during the Cuba debate relating to our trade embargo and other U.S. bilateral policies, the EU showed no change in

18. (C) In Fourth (decolonization) Committee France and the UK generally were strong partners. However, their influence within the EU caucus a

19. (SBU) The legal affairs committee's resolutions, invariably adopted by consensus, featured like-minded cooperation between EU legal expert
20. (SBU) The budget committee's end game is still being played out. From the start of the intertwined debates over scales of contribution and

LOOKING AHEAD TO UNGA65

21. (C) According to the UNGA tradition of rotating its Presidency among the regional groupings, WEOG (whose numbers are weighted heavily towa

22. (C) Also looking ahead to UNGA65, the EU (under its new, broader Lisbon Treaty mandate) will seek to become an enhanced observer. Subject

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observership until the second half of 2010, they are already previewing their request to the UN membership. They have reached out to key groups
23. (U) Another election is scheduled at UNGA65, for the two WEOG rotating seats on the 2011-2012 UNSC. Three candidates are contending for th

24. (C) Comment: Despite initial concerns that European delegations would soon come to view new U.S. flexibility (which generally reinforces t

25. (SBU) Recommendation: Since the EU conceals its UNGA65 positions by summer 2010, it is in our interest to begin early, energetic, and deta

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